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INTRODUCTION

Prior to 1968, most lawyers could ignore the few federal statutes
regulating debt and debt creation.' 1968 heralded the dawn of a
1. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a-77bbbb (West 1981 & Supp. 1984) (issuance or public sale of
securities); 31 U.S.C.A. § 3101 (public debt), amended by Act of July 6, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98,
98 Stat. 313 (West 1983 & Supp. 1984); 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 911-984 (West 1975 & Supp. 1984)

(ship mortgages) 49 U.S.C.A. § 1403 (West 1976) (aircraft financing). Regulation of aircraft
and ship mortgage transactions is limited to establishing mechanisms for perfection of liens.
Regulation of the public debt of the United States is obviously a federal matter. The true
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new age for attorneys representing lenders and borrowers in consumer transactions, with the passage of the first of a number of statutes referred to collectively as the Federal Consumer Credit
Protection Act.2 The focus of these statutes is "truth-in-lending"that is to say, disclosure. In its endeavor to promote "truth-in-lending," Congress has enacted a complicated morass of statutes and has
granted rulemaking powers to numerous federal agencies, each of
which has promulgated complex regulations. For example, since
1972 the Federal Trade Commission has published rules which directly affect consumer debt transactions.3
Congress did not choose to displace state regulation, but rather
left state regulation in place to supplement or supersede the federal
statutes, thereby further complicating interpretation of this area of
the law. More than brief reference to state regulation, with some
emphasis on Texas law, is beyond the scope of this article.
The federal incursion into what had traditionally been matters
left to the states was, and continues to be, premised upon congressional belief that the credit industry and the states have permitted
unfair, deceptive, or inequitable consumer lending transactions to
take place.'
The majority of the statutes and rules discussed in this article are
not designed to directly change lending practices, but, rather, are
designed to force lenders to disclose the nature, extent, cost, source,
and other factors regarding credit, credit-like, and credit-affecting
arrangements. The penalties for violating the statutes vary, but the
ultimate result is that a debt may become uncollectible or unenforceable. In the alternative, a violation may give rise to damages
predecessor of federal regulation of ordinary consumer debt is federal regulation of interstate securities transactions. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 77e (West 1981). The federal intervention in
the marketplace in both instances has been justified upon the basis of failure of state regulations and market abuse of consumers. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196
(1976) (investor protection in securities regulation); 15 U.S.C.A. § 1601 (West 1982) (consumer protection).
2. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1693r (West 1982 & Supp. 1984). The first provisions enacted in 1968 included the original "Truth-in-Lending Act" as title 1, while other titles regulated credit extension and garnishment. See IR. CLONTZ, TRUTH-IN-LENDING MANUAL
1.01 (5th ed. 1982) (synopsis of history of various enactments).
3. The FTC promulgates the rules discussed under the authority granted the FTC
under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which grants the FTC power to make rules
prohibiting unfair or deceptive practices affecting interstate commerce. See 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 45 (West 1973 & Supp. 1984).
4. See id § 1601 (West 1982).
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which offset or exceed the debt. In either event, the result from the
lender's perspective is frequently the same: money has been advanced which cannot be recovered. From the borrower's perspective, the statutes and rules provide a shield which may enable the
borrower to escape repayment.
The bar generally recognizes the dangers that these statutes pose
and is aware of the benefits that may be conferred upon debtors.
Unfortunately, law schools rarely teach courses covering these statutes, law journal articles rarely attempt to deal with these statutes in
a comprehensive manner, and treatises, though extensive and well
organized, are generally expensive and are not usually purchased by
the average practitioner, who only occasionally faces a problem in
this area.
The Truth-in-Lending Act5 and Truth-in-Leasing Act 6 are generally familiar to most attorneys, and source materials explaining
these acts are widely available;7 therefore, these acts are not addressed in this article. Rather, this article is intended as a survey of
less familiar federal legislation, with explanations of the more important provisions. It is an accessible, relatively condensed tool
which gives the practitioner some guidance as to federal statutes and
rules affecting debtor-creditor relations, excluding those regarding
Truth-in-Lending and Truth-in-Leasing.
A few words of warning are in order regarding the structure of the
article. Do not look for continuity or transition. Sometimes there is
continuity among or between the statutes, but more frequently the
statutes must be treated individually or sequentially. A transaction
may raise multiple issues which require analysis under one or more
of the statutes. The transactions governed by these statutes are primarily consumer transactions involving borrowers who are natural
persons trying to secure money, credit, or the equivalent for personal, family, or household purposes. Although some of the statutes
discussed have some impact on commercial lending, the focus of the
article is on consumer lending.

5. Id §§ 1601-1667e (West 1982 & Supp. 1984). Comparisons of certain aspects of the
Truth-in-Lending Act with provisions of other debt regulation statutes will be made occa-

sionally throughout the article.
6. Id.§§ 1667-1667e (West 1982). The Consumer Leasing Act is part E of subchapter I
of the Consumer Credit Protection Act. See id.§§ 1667-1667e.
7. See I, 2 R. CLONTZ, TRUTH-IN-LENDING MANUAL (5th ed. 1982 & Supp. 1984).
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This survey includes materials relating to the following: (1) the
Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, 8 which includes the Fair
Credit Billing Act,9 the Fair Credit Reporting Act,' 0 the Equal12
Credit Opportunity Act," the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,
and the Electronic Fund Transfer Act;' 3 and (2) the Federal Trade
Commission rules, including those governing door-to-door 4sales,
holder in due course statutes, and consumer credit practices.'
The statutes and rules discussed above, as well as the regulations
implementing the statutes, are set forth in detail. Case law is cited
where appropriate, although case law is often scanty and may be of
little help in this area since the cases usually turn upon minor or
isolated issues and give very little sense of an entire statute or group
of statutes. A detailed table of contents has been included and the
reader may wish to use it as a guide or checklist for issues of
concern.
II.

EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT AND REGULATION

B

The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA),' 5 together with Regulation B, 16 is specifically designed to limit the ability of regulated
lenders to deny credit to certain protected classes. Unlike most
other federal statutes discussed in this article, the ECOA creates a
cause of action only when the lender refuses, cancels, or adversely
modifies a credit application or account of a member of a protected
class. 7
As with other provisions under the Consumer Credit Protection
8. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1693r (West 1982 & Supp. 1984). Subchapter II, dealing with
garnishment, will not be addressed in this article. See id. §§ 1671-1677 (West 1982).
9. Id §§ 1666-1666j (West 1982 & Supp. 1984). The Fair Credit Billing Act is part D of
subchapter I of the Consumer Credit Protection Act. See id §§ 1666-1666j.
10. Id.§§ 1681-1681t.
I. Id.§§ 1691-1691f.
12. Id.§§ 1692-1692o.
13. Id.§§ 1693-1693r.
14. See 16 C.F.R. § 429 (1984) (door-to-door sales); 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1984) (holder in
due course); 49 Fed. Reg. 7789 (1984) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 444) (credit practices).
15. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1691-1691f (West 1982 & Supp. 1984).
16. 12 C.F.R. § 202 (1984).
17. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(d)(6) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(c) (1984). A person
protected need merely be an applicant and need not file a formal application to have standing; the plaintiff, however, must also allege that credit was denied because of impermissible
discrimination. See Cragin v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 498 F. Supp. 379, 383-84 (D.
Nev. 1980).
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Act, the ECOA does not apply to all lending transactions. Three
elements determine the applicability of the statute: (1) the transaction must be a credit transaction and the credit applied for must be a
type of credit regulated by the ECOA;' 8 (2) the credit applicant must
be in one of the protected classes or groups;' 9 and (3) the lender
2
denying the credit must be a lender regulated by the ECOA. 1 If
these elements are met, the credit applicant may recover if credit
was denied on grounds prohibited by the ECOA.
None of these provisions limit the ECOA to consumer transactions. The Act is generally applicable to all lending for any purpose,
although different rules apply to business and certain other types of
loans.2
A.

TransactionsAffected

The ECOA applies to denials of credit in the following situations:
(1) the applicant seeks "to defer payment of debt"; (2) the applicant
seeks "to incur debts and defer its payment"; or (3) the applicant
seeks "to purchase goods, other property, or services, and defer payment" of the purchase price.22 The ECOA applies to all stages of
the credit transaction. The various stages include "every aspect of
an applicant's dealings with a creditor regarding an application for,
or an existing extension of, credit including, but not limited to, information requirements; investigation procedures; standards of
creditworthiness; terms of credit; furnishing of credit information;
revocation, alteration, or termination of credit; and collection
procedures. "23
18. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1691(a), 1691a(b), (d) (West 1982).
19. See id § 1691(a)(I)-(3).
20. See id.
§ 1691 a(e). The statute and Regulation B explain that a creditor is a person
regularly extending or arranging credit or referring debtors to creditors. See id § 1691 a(e);

12 C.F.R. § 202.2(1) (1984).
21. See 12 C.F.R. § 202.4(a) (1984). Business credit and certain other types of credit

are governed by less stringent rules. See id.§ 202.3(a).
22. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691a(d) (West 1982). While the situations in which the ECOA

applies are similar to those covered by the Truth-in-Lending Act, the ECOA is not limited
by a four installment rule. Compare id.§ 1602(f) (four installment rule applies) with id.
§§ 1691-1691f (no rule). The ECOA also applies to leases which are disguised sales. See

Waldron v. Best T.V. & Stereo Rentals, 485 F. Supp. 718, 719 (D. Md. 1979).
23. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(m) (1984). The application for credit giving rise to the claim may
be either oral or written. See id § 202.2(f). However, a lender may require written application. See Cragin v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 498 F. Supp. 379, 383 (D. Nev. 1980).
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Exempted Transactions

The ECOA and Regulation B exempt certain special purpose programs for economically deprived or socially disadvantaged persons
designed to meet particular social needs. 24 Certain classes of transactions are exempted only from particular requirements, primarily
inquiries relating to marital status and gender. 25 The exempted
transactions include: (1) public utility credit, (2) securities credit,
(3) incidental consumer credit, (4) business credit, and (5) credit extended by a governmental entity.26
C.

ProtectedParties and Regulated Lenders

The ECOA basically prohibits discrimination on the following
bases: "race, color, religion, national origin, sex, or marital status,
or age," basic source of income from public assistance, and good
faith exercise of rights under the CCPA.27 In addition, the ECOA
protects persons who deal with members of a protected class.28
Race, color, and religion are carefully protected categories under the
ECOA and Regulation B.29 Although discrimination on the basis of
24. Reverse discrimination is not prohibited. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(c) (West 1982);
12 C.F.R. § 202.8 (1984).
25. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691b(a) (West 1982).
26. See 12 C.F.R. § 202.3(a) (1984). Public utilities are permitted to inquire concerning marital status and seek credit reports on both spouses. See id § 202.3(b). The securities
credit exemption applies to spousal and gender inquiries. See id.§ 202.3(c). Incidental consumer credit is credit for which neither a finance charge is applied nor interest charged, is
payable in less than four installments, is purely consumer, personal, family, or household
credit, and is not subject to a credit card agreement. See id. § 202.3(a)(3). Incidental consumer credit is exempted from inquiries concerning gender, source of income, spousal relationship, and the right to demand comakers. See id. § 202.3(d). Although also partially
exempt, business credit is governed by ECOA's basic prohibitions, which include prohibitions against racial and gender discrimination. See id. §§ 202.3(e), 202.4.
27. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(a) (West 1982). The creditor may not inquire about
sources such as alimony or child support. See 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d)(2) (1984). The creditor
can ask the applicant to reveal all sources of income the applicant wishes the lender to
consider for purposes of extending credit, with a disclosure that, while there is no obligation
to disclose such income, undisclosed income will not be used to determine creditworthiness.
See id
28. See 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(z) n.3 (1984). An example given by Regulation B notes that
"a creditor may not discriminate against a non-Jewish applicant because of that person's
business dealings with Jews." Id.
29. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 169 1(a)(1) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. §§ 202.2(z), 202.4, 202.8
(1984). The burden of proof is that the creditor treats identically qualified applicants differently on the basis of race or color. See Cherry v. Amoco Oil Co., 490 F. Supp. 1026, 1030
(N.D. Ga. 1980). Recently, the Fifth Circuit, in O'Dowd v. South Central Bell, upheld a
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national origin is prohibited, a creditor is permitted to inquire about
the debtor's permanent residence.30 The prohibition against gender
discrimination has two chief aspects: (1) a creditor may not request
or consider an applicant's gender or marital status except in certain
situations; and (2) a creditor may not use any information it obtains
to discriminate against an applicant on the basis of gender or marital status. 3' Discrimination based upon age is prohibited, so long as
"the applicant has the capacity to contract. '32 Age, however, can be
considered as a relevant factor where related to conditions such as
length of lifespan and length of time until retirement.33 Under such
conditions, age is relevant to the ability to repay.
The lenders governed by ECOA are only those lenders who, in
the ordinary course of business, regularly participate in credit extension decisions, regularly refer credit applicants, and regularly select
or screen applicants; the regulation also applies to assignees, subrogees, and transferees. 34 At the initiation of an application or, subsequently, at the time of an extension or renegotiation of a credit
transaction, a creditor is prohibited from requiring information concerning the marital status, sex, birth control, child-bearing or -rearing practices, race, color, religion, national origin, and income from
alimony, child support, or separate maintenance payments, unless
summary judgment dismissing a claim under this provision of the ECOA where plaintiffs
failed to plead facts sufficient to controvert defendant's undisputed showing of a nondiscriminatory basis for its actions. See O'Dowd v. South Central Bell, 729 F.2d 347, 349-51
(5th Cir. 1984). Bell had demanded a deposit for continued telephone service because of late
payments which had occurred four times in 12 months. See id at 349-50. O'Dowd argued
that the company required the deposit because the O'Dowds lived in a particular area code
in which there were a number of black and elderly subscribers. See id.
at 349-51. While the
O'Dowds' case was dismissed, the Fifth Circuit opinion implies that, but for the showing by
Bell of a legitimate reason for the deposit demand, the O'Dowds might well have been able
to state a case. See id.at 349-51.
30. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(a)(1) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d)(5) (1984).
31. See 15 U.S.C.A.§ 1691(a) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d)(3), (4) (1984). The sex
discrimination provisions are quite complicated. See 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d)(1)-(3) (1984). An
applicant generally may not be required to disclose sex or marital status. See id.Therefore,
titles such as Mr., Mrs., and Miss may be disclosed only on a voluntary basis. See id.Childrearing and birth control questions are banned, but not questions about number of dependents or expenditures regarding dependent-related obligations. See id § 202.5(d)(4). Unless
the applicant lives in a community property state, marital status inquiries are prohibited
where the applicant applies for individual, unsecured credit. See id.§ 202.5(d)(1).
32. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(a)(1) (West 1982).
33. See 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(2) n.9 (1984).
34. See id.§ 202.2(1).
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specifically permitted under some exemption. Regulation B also
defines and provides strict regulations governing appropriate datascoring systems used to determine whether credit will be granted or
denied.36 A creditor generally may not change the status of an
existing account on the basis of age, change of name, or change of
marital status, unless a former spouse's income was a factor in credit
extension or if community property divisions would affect
creditworthiness.37
D. Notification Requirements
Within thirty days of receiving a completed credit application, the
creditor must notify the applicant concerning the credit decision.38
If a creditor acts adversely upon an original application or an existing account, it must either give written notification of the reasons
for the action,39 or it must give the debtor written notice of his or her
right to receive such reasons. The time during which the debtor
may demand an explanation may be limited to a period not to exceed sixty days.' Failure to comply with the notice requirements
35. See id. § 202.6(b). Information concerning such issues, if voluntarily provided, may
be considered. See id. § 202.6(b)(5). For example, if alimony is listed as a source of income,
the creditor may consider the likelihood that the payments will be consistent; however, a
creditor may never consider the likelihood that income will be reduced by pregnancy or
child rearing. Compare id § 202.6(b)(5) (alimony) with id § 202.6(b)(3) (pregnancy or child
rearing).
36. See id § 202.2(p)(1), (p)(2), (t). An "empirically derived credit system" is one in
which points are assigned "to key attributes describing the applicant." See id § 202.2(p)(1).
The system must be statistically sound and may only be used to evaluate creditworthiness.
See id. § 202.2(p)(2). Any other system is considered judgmental. See id § 202.2(t).
37. See id § 202.7(c).
38. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(d)(1) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(a) (1984). A creditor
may wait 90 days if it has offered the debtor a substantially different amount or substantially
different terms from those originally requested; that is, if the application is approved in part,
but with different terms from those requested, the creditor need not explain the denial of the
original application until 90 days have passed. See id § 202.9(a)(iv).
39. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(d)(2)(A) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(a)(2)(i) (1984). An
adverse action is denial, refusal to grant credit on substantially the same terms or amounts
requested, termination, unfavorable change, or refusal to increase limits. See 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 1691(d)(6) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(c) (1984).
40. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(d)(2)(B) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(a)(1), (2)(ii) (1984).
The creditor must respond to the request for explanation within 30 days of receipt. See 15
U.S.C.A. § 1691(d)(2)(B) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(a)(2)(ii) (1984). The explanation
may be oral if the debtor is told he or she may have it reduced to writing on demand. See id.
§ 202.9(a)(2)(ii). Small creditors, which have fewer than 150 applications per year, may give
all notices and explanations orally. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(d)(5) (West 1982).
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constitutes an actionable breach of the ECOA. 4'
E.

Remedies, Defenses, and Limitations

In addition to the private civil action remedies allowed under
other provisions of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, the ECOA
allows punitive damages.42 Actual damages may be recovered for
out-of-pocket expenses and intangible damages. Punitive damages
43
may be awarded irrespective of the existence of actual damages,
but only a maximum of $10,000 may be awarded in an individual
discrimination case. 44 The ECOA permits class actions, but punitive damage awards are limited to the lesser of $500,000 or one percent of the creditor's net worth.45 Where punitive damages are
alleged, whether in individual or class actions, the frequency and
persistence of a creditor's noncompliance, "the number of persons
adversely affected," the financial resources of the creditor itself, and
the extent of the creditor's intent to violate the statute are to be considered in determining the amount of punitive damages to be
awarded.46
As with other CCPA provisions, good faith compliance with Federal Reserve Board rules, forms, interpretations, and regulations is a
defense.47 The limitations period for ECOA actions is generally two
41. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691e(a) (West 1982). If an action violates both state law and the
ECOA, the debtor may recover under either, but not both. See id. § 169 1d(e); see also Car-

roll v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 434 F. Supp. 557, 561-63 (E.D. La. 1977) (ECOA provisions violated by failure to provide notice of actual reasons for denial which would have justified
denial).
42. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 169 1e(b) (West 1982); see also Smith v. Lakeside Foods, Inc., 449

F. Supp. 171, 172 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (punitive damages, costs, and injunctive relief may be
ordered even without actual damages).
43. See Cherry v. Amoco Oil Co., 490 F. Supp. 1026, 1029 (N.D. Cal. 1978). Intangibles include emotional harm, harm to the applicant's reputation for creditworthiness, loss
of purchasing power, mental anguish, and humiliation. See Shuman v. Standard Oil Co.,
453 F. Supp. 1150, 1153-54 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
44. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 169le(b) (West 1982); see also Vander Missen v. Kellog-Citizens

Nat'l Bank, 481 F. Supp. 742, 744 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (factors to be weighed in determining
punitive damages in an individual case).
45. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691e(b) (West 1982). In addition, attorneys' fees and costs are
recoverable. See id § 169 1e(d).
46. See id. § 1691e(b); see also Vander Missen v. Kellog-Citizens Nat'l Bank, 481 F.

Supp. 742, 744-48 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (discussion of factors' relevance).
47. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691e(e) (West 1982). The leading case concerning good faith

compliance with direction provided by regulatory agencies, Ford Motor Credit Co. v.Mihollin, arose under the Truth-in-Lending Act. See 444 U.S. 555, 568 (1980). The Supreme
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years.48
III.

FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT

In 1970, Congress decided to plug a gaping hole in the CCPA.
Recognizing that frequently there would be no credit transaction
absent a favorable credit report, Congress enacted the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA). 49 Like other provisions of the CCPA, protection is provided by regulation of the flow of information: first, by
limiting the purposes for which consumer credit information may be
used, and second, by granting consumers the ability to review and
object to the contents of credit reports. ° In contrast with most of
Court held in Mihollin that agency opinion should be given great weight, noting that "a
court that tries to chart a true course to the [Truth-in-Lending] Act's purpose embarks upon
a voyage without a compass when it disregards the agency's views." See id. at 568. The
Court reiterated its stance in Anderson Bros. Ford v. Valencia, another Truth-in-Lending
case, stating that the courts should defer to the Federal Reserve Board's construction unless
there are apparent contradictions to the Act. See 452 U.S. 205, 219 (1981).
48. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691e(f) (West 1982). Courts are divided on whether counterclaims are barred by the limitations period. Compare In re Remington, 19 Bankr. 718, 71921 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982) (counterclaim allowed more than two years after violation) with
Ford City Bank v. Goldman, 424 N.E.2d 761, 763 (I11.App. Ct. 1981) (counterclaim denied
due to limitations). However, the limitations period is one year following the commencement of governmental action in an agency enforcement action or the commencement by the
United States Attorney General of a discrimination proceeding against a creditor when a
debtor is a victim of the alleged discrimination. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691e(f) (West 1982).
49. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1681-1681(t) (West 1982 & Supp. 1984). In its findings, Congress announced that regulation of credit reporting was necessary to protect both the credit
system from a loss of public confidence and the consumer from unfairness, discrimination,
and invasion of privacy. See id § 1681. In addition, Congress passed legislation, in 1980,
which allowed the Veterans' Administration to refer debtors to a consumer reporting
agency. See Veterans' Rehabilitation and Education Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96,
§ 466, 94 Stat. 2171; see also Hearing on the Collection of Debts Owed the Veterans'Administration. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Special In vestigations of the Comm. on Veterans'
Affairs, House ofRepresentatives, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1980) (statement of William F.
McQuillen, Special Assistant to the General Counsel, Veterans' Administration) (need for
governmental agencies to utilize consumer reporting agencies to collect debts). Subsequently, all governmental agencies were authorized to utilize consumer reporting agencies to
collect debts. See Debt Collection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-365, 96 Stat. 1749. The credit
reporting process may also affect or be involved with the debt collection process. New credit
may be denied unless old claims are satisfied, and a consumer in need of new credit may
thus be forced to pay a contested claim in order to clear his or her credit rating. The FCRA
prohibits reporting of obsolete information and limits reports concerning disputed information. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1681c, 1681i (West 1982 & Supp. 1984). Such requirements do
much to cure this problem.
50. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681b (West 1982 & Supp. 1984) (permissible purposes); id
§§ 1681 g- 168 li (disclosures to consumers and dispute resolution).
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the other provisions of the CCPA, however, the regulated party does
not deal directly with the debtor." The FCRA supplements, but
does not supersede, state5 2 statutory or common law, including the
law of libel and slander.
Enforcement of the FCRA is assigned to the Federal Reserve
Board, Comptroller, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Trade Commission, and a number of other agencies.5 3 No one
agency is authorized to issue regulations.54 Guidelines for financial
institutions are issued jointly by these agencies. 5
A.

Definitions and Scope

Only individual consumers are protected by the FCRA.5 6 While
the FCRA only governs consumer reports, these may be written,
oral, or any other communication bearing on creditworthiness used
to establish eligibility for consumer credit or insurance, employment, or other authorized purposes.5 7 Regulating the issuance of
51. See id § 1681a(f).
52. See id § 168 It; see also Geltzer, Fair Credit Reporting Act.: Survey & Checklist, 94
BANKING L.J. 223, 224-27 (1977) (analysis of applicable common law).
53. See I CONSUMER CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 680 (1984).
54. See id at 680.
55. See id at 680.
56. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681a(c) (West 1982).
57. See id. § 168la(d). Other authorized purposes include credit investigations necessary to obtain governmental licenses or benefits and legitimate business needs. See id
§ 168 1b(3)(D), (E). The term "legitimate business needs" refers to the needs of the lender or
recipient of the report, but does not extend the FCRA to cover business or nonconsumer
transactions. See Fernandez v. Retail Credit Co., 349 F. Supp. 652, 654-55 (E.D. La. 1972).
The "legitimate business need" provision has been held not to include publication of a general list of persons with a history of writing bad checks. See Greenway v. Information Dynamics, 399 F. Supp. 1092, 1095 (D. Ariz. 1974), afl'd, 524 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
dismissed, 424 U.S. 936 (1976). Consumer reports may only be issued for the authorized uses
or in response to a court order. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681b(1), (2) (West 1982). Ordinarily,
consumer reports are issued at the written request of the consumer who has authorized the
report after being requested to do so by a third party, that is, a potential lender. See Greenway v. Information Dynamics, 399 F. Supp. 1092, 1097 (D. Ariz. 1974), aff'd, 524 F.2d 1145
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 424 U.S. 936 (1976). While a court order may justify generation of the report, there is some debate about whether grand jury subpoenas constitute court
orders. Compare United States v. Retail Credit Men's Ass'n, 501 F. Supp. 21, 22 (M.D. Fla.
1980) (grand jury subpoenas are court orders) with In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Concerning Credit Bureau, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 1174, 1176-77 (N.D. Pa. 1980) (grand
jury subpoenas not court orders). Finally, where a reporting agency issued microfiche check
writing histories to subscribing merchants, the district court for Arizona held that the reports
violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(3), which prohibits distribution unless the reporting agency reasonably believes the report will be used for a legitimate business purpose. See Greenway v.
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and purposes for credit reports arguably limits the Orwellian oversight of consumer credit reporting agencies to the legitimate business needs of the credit industry. The FCRA applies only to an
entity defined by the FCRA as a "consumer reporting agency,"
which includes:
any person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in . . . the practice of assembling or
evaluating consumer credit information or other information . . . for
the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties . . . and
commerce for . . . preparing
uses any means or facility of interstate
8

or furnishing conswner reports.1
The FCRA does not apply to agencies of federal or state government.5 9 The FCRA also does not apply to ledger experience, which
is considered statements regarding the actual experience of the reporting party with the consumer. 60 Ledger-experience reports provided by lenders to third parties recounting actual experience with
the credit applicant constitute the largest and most important exception to the FCRA. The consumer may rely upon state statutory and
common law protection when such reports are involved. 6
In addition to credit reports, the FCRA also regulates "investigative consumer reports," which are reports on character, general reputation, and lifestyle that do not contain specific credit history
information.62
Information Dynamics, 399 F. Supp. 1092, 1095-96 (D. Ariz. 1974). Because the merchants

receiving the reports could not conceivably have any business relationship with all individuals named on the list, most of the individual reports were not for legitimate business purposes. See id at 1096.
58. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681a(f) (West 1982).
59. See Ollestad v. Kelley, 573 F.2d 1109, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 1978) (not applicable to
federal agencies); Geltzer, Fair Credit Reporting Act: Survey & Checklist, 94 BANKING L.J.
223, 237-38 (1977) (not applicable to state agencies). Private persons who compile government agency reports are "consumer reporting agencies." See [1969-1973 Transfer Binder]
99,445 (1971).
CONSUMER CRED. GUIDE (CCH)
60. See Todd v. Associated Credit Bureau Servs., 451 F. Supp. 447, 449 (E.D. Pa. 1977),
aft'd, 578 F.2d 1376 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1068 (1979).
61. Only the law of libel and slander would apply in Texas since the Texas statute on
credit reporting would not appear to reach "ledger experience reports." See TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art, 9016 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
62. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 168 1a(e) (West 1982). Such reports may not be prepared or procured unless disclosure of the report is made to the consumer, or, in the alternative, the
report is prepared for an employer in situations in which the consumer has not yet specifically applied for the position. Compare id § 1681d(a)(l) (disclosure to consumer) with id
§ 168 ld(a)(2) (employer report).
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Compliance

Consumer reporting agencies are required to adopt and maintain
procedures which ensure that their customers in the credit industry
do not abuse credit reports. Prospective users must identify themselves, certify the purpose for which the information is requested,
and certify that the information will not be used for any other purpose. 63 The reporting agency is primarily responsible for determining the identity of its customers and the uses it intends to make of
the report and must deny access to a report if the agency has reasonable grounds to believe that the report will be used for an impermissible purpose.64 The reporting agency is also responsible for
establishing and following procedures designed to ensure the greatest possible accuracy of the information reported.65
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) suggests the following
measures to ensure compliance: (1) written agreements with users
setting forth purposes for which reports will be used; (2) "on-site
visit[s] to the prospective user's place of business" to determine actual identification; (3) references from banks and business houses
for new users; (4) close supervision of employees to ensure accuracy
of data and accuracy of recordation; (5) careful evaluation of data to
determine "context . . . for which certain information originally
was collected"; (6) procedures to guard against data processing errors; and (7) use of more than one source of information.66
C. Disclosure of Investigative Consumer Reports
The FCRA requires that disclosure of the investigation be given
to the consumer unless an investigative report is to be prepared for
employment purposes in situations in which the consumer has not
applied for employment.67 Written notice of the date of the request
must be mailed or actually delivered within three days of the re63. See id § 1681e(a).
64. See id. § 1681e(a).
65. See id. § 168 1e(f). Adverse information in investigative reports may not be included in subsequent reports unless the information is verified by the subsequent report, is
not more than three months old, or is of public record. See id. § 1681/, see also Houser v.
Equifax, Inc., 602 F.2d 811, 817-18 (8th Cir. 1979) (no negligence); Millstone v. O'Hanlon
Reports, Inc., 528 F.2d 829, 833-34 (8th Cir. 1976) (improper procedures found).
66. 5 CONSUMER CRED. GUIDE (CCH)

11,305 (1977).

67. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 168 ld(a)(2) (West 1982). Evaluations by employers of current
employees are generally exempt from pre-report disclosure, but use of the report which ad-
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quest for the report. 6s The initial notice must also inform the consumer of his or her right to ask for additional disclosures, including
the nature and extent of the requested information. 69 These disclosures are to be provided by the person requesting the report, not the
reporting agency.7° The consumer-requested disclosures must be
forwarded within five days of receiving the consumer request.',
Consumer reporting agencies must disclose the following types of
information to consumers who properly identify themselves: (1) nature and substance of information on file, (2) sources of information
(sources of investigative reports are not disclosed except where legal
actions are filed under the FCRA), and (3) recipients of employment reports during the preceding two years and recipients of reports prepared for other purposes during the preceding six months.72
The consumer usually may be charged for the report information.73
However, if the customer has been notified that his credit has been
affected, and makes a request within thirty days, he or she must be
furnished the information free of charge. 4
Requests for disclosure by the credit reporting agency will generally be triggered when a consumer receives notice that credit or insurance has been denied.75 Even where consumer credit reports do
not form the basis for denial or increased charges, consumers have a
right to make written demand of the reasons for adverse action.7 6
The FCRA sets forth basic conditions for the physical conduct of
disclosure, including restriction of disclosure to normal business
versely affects the employee requires disclosure. See 5 CONSUMER

CRED. GUIDE

(CCH)

1

11,305 (1977).
68. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681d(a)(1)(A) (West 1982). The FTC suggests that the required
notice explain that the report will use interviews with neighbors and other factors to determine reputation and character. See 5 CONSUMER CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 11,306 (1977).
69. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 168ld(a)(1)(B), (b) (West 1982).
70. See id. § 1681d(b).
71. See id. § 1681d(b).
72. See id § 168 lg(a); see also Ackerley v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 658, 660-61
(D. Wyo. 1974) (damages for refusal to allow examination).
73. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681j (West 1982).
74. See id.
75. Where a credit report is involved in the decision to deny or adversely affect credit
or insurance, that is, by increasing charges, the user must disclose the name and address of
the reporting agency. See id. § 168 1m(a).
76. See id § 168 1m(b). The denial or adverse action must give notice of this right. See
id § 1681m(b).
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hours on reasonable notice.77 Identification of the consumer is required.78 The consumer may be accompanied by a third person but
the consumer may be required to give written authorization for discussions before a third party.79 If the consumer has made prior
written request and will pay the toll charges, telephonic disclosure is
mandated. Personnel trained to provide disclosure must be provided by the reporting agency.8°
D.

Obsolete Information

The FCRA considers most adverse credit history more than seven
years old to be obsolete as a matter of law and prohibits reporting:
(1) suits and judgments more than seven years before the report unless the statute of limitations is longer; (2) paid tax liens if more than
seven years have elapsed since payment; (3) "accounts placed for
collection or charged" off more than seven years earlier; (4) arrest,
indictment, or conviction records if disposition, release, or parole
occurred more than seven years before the report; and (5) any other
adverse item more than seven years old.8 ' Bankruptcies, however,
may be reported for ten years.82
The statute makes certain exceptions which permit disclosure of
reports more than seven years old used in connection with loans or
insurance policies involving principal or fair value in excess of
$50,000 and in situations involving employment at an annual salary
in excess of $20,000.83 The FTC suggests that obsolete information
be filed separately so that it will not be reported unless the credit
transaction or employment is within the listed exceptions.84
Where investigative consumer reports are involved, public
records may always be reported. However, adverse information reported in a previous report may not be included in a subsequent
report unless it is re-verified or unless it is no more than three
77. See id § 1681h(a).
78. See id § 1681h(b).
79. See id § 1681h(d).
80. See id § 168 1h(c).

81. See id § 1681c(a)(2)-(6).
82. See id § 1681c(a)(I).
83. See id. § 1681c(b). Obsolete information will be retained and will probably be used

frequently considering the inflation rate in housing costs and salaries.
84. See 5 CONSUMER CRED. GUIDE (CCH)

11,305 (1977).
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months old.85
E. Disputes ConcerningAccuracy
The reporting agency must immediately attempt to verify disputed information unless it believes a consumer dispute to be frivolous.86 Inaccurate information must be deleted immediately.87 If
the dispute is not resolved, the consumer may set forth the dispute
in a statement which will thereafter be included in the file and reported to users.88 At the consumer's request, the reporting agency
must give notice of corrections or disputes to all consumer-identified
users who received credit information within six months and employment information within two years.89
F.

Use of Public Records in Employment Reports

The FCRA requires that preparers of reports to be used for employment-related purposes give notice to affected consumers of reported adverse public record information and the name and address
of the user. 90
G. Liability of Reporting Agencies and Users
Reporting agencies or users are liable for failure to comply with
notice, accuracy, and disclosure requirements. 91 The consumer may
92
be entitled to recover actual damages, costs, and attorneys' fees.
Punitive damages may be recovered if the action successfully shows
willful noncompliance. 93
85. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681/(West 1982).

86. See id § 1681i(a).
87. See id § 1681i(a).
88. See id. § 168 1i(b), (c).
89. See id. § 168 1i(d). The reporting agency must give notice of this right to the complaining consumer. See id. § 168 1i(d).
90. See id. § 1681k(I).
91. See id. § 168In.
92. Seeid §§ 1681n, 1681o.
93. See id. § 168 In. Haphazardness and refusals io comply with requests have been
held to be sufficient to allow awards of punitive damages. See, e.g., Bryant v. TRW, Inc.,
689 F.2d 72, 78-79 (6th Cir. 1982) (a "little added effort" would have avoided error); Carroll
v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 434 F. Supp. 557, 560 (E.D. La. 1977) (information not provided until
after lawsuit filed); Collins v. Retail Credit Co., 410 F. Supp. 924, 931-32 (E.D. Mich. 1976)
(haphazard, inexact, reckless methods).
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H. Jurisdiction
The statute vests jurisdiction in the federal courts without regard
to the amount in controversy.94 State courts may also hear these
matters at the plaintiff's election. 95
I. Limitations and Defenses
Limitations ordinarily will run after two years under the FCRA.96
However, if the defendant "materially and willfully misrepresented"
information to the consumer which was "material to the establishment of. . .liability," the statute runs for two years after discovery
of the misrepresentation.97
Liability for failure to comply with permissible purposes and disclosures to the consumer required by statute may be avoided if the
user or reporting agency can show, by preponderance of the evidence, that "he maintained reasonable procedures to insure compli"98
ance .
Unless an action is predicated on an allegation of negligence or
willfulness as provided in the statute, consumers may not bring an
action alleging defamation, negligence, or invasion of privacy after
disclosure; if the action is brought, the consumer must allege and
show that "false information [was] furnished with malice or willful
intent to injure [the] consumer." 99 The defense of "reasonable standards to insure compliance" should be well taken if the defendant
has followed the procedures suggested by the FTC.'
IV. FAIR CREDIT BILLING ACT AND REGULATION Z
The Fair Credit Billing Act' 0 (FCBA) provides protection for the
consumer from billing errors, incorrect credit reports, and other
practices dealing with the payment of the consumer's debts. Credit
card billing and liability are also covered by provisions of this act.
94. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681p (West 1982).

95. See Ruth v. Westinghouse Credit Co., 373 F. Supp. 468, 469-71 (W.D. Okla. 1974).
96. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681p (West 1982).

97. See id§ 168 1p.
98. See id.§ 1681d(c) (investigative consumer reports); id.§ 1681m(c) (user requirements).
99. See id.
§ 1681h(e).
100. See 5 CONSUMER CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 11,305 (1977).
101. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1666-1666j (West 1982 & Supp. 1984). The regulations implementing the Act are included in Regulation Z. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.13 (1984).
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By giving consumers an opportunity to object to certain credit
transaction charges, limiting liability for unauthorized credit card
use, and preserving claims and defenses arising in open-end credit
sales, the FCBA, like other provisions of the CCPA, gives debtors
offsets and defenses which may negate or offset underlying debt.
Depending upon the circumstances, the FCBA, like its companion
statutes, may often make debt uncollectible.
A.

TransactionsAffected

The FCBA and operative provisions of Regulation Z generally
1 2 The FCBA's regulaapply only to consumer credit transactions.
0 3
1
tion is limited to open-end transactions.
B.

Billing Errors

The primary thrust of the FCBA is "to protect the consumer
against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card practices."'" The FCBA provides an extensive definition of a billing
error and the procedure to be followed when a consumer feels that
such an error has occurred. The FCBA and Regulation Z define
billing error as follows:
(1) A reflection on or with a periodic statement of an extension of
credit that is not made to the consumer or to a person who has actual,
implied, or apparent authority to use the consumer's credit card or
open-end credit plan;0 5
(2) A reflection on a statement of goods or services not accepted by
the obligor or his designee or not delivered to the obligor or his designee in accordance with the agreement made at the time of a
102. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1666(a) (West 1982). Under Regulation Z, however, certain
credit card billing provisions are applicable in non-consumer situations. See 12 C.F.R.
§ 226.12 (1984).
103. See

FEDERAL CREDIT LEGISLATION SUBCOMM. OF THE CORP., BANKING AND

BUSINESS LAW COMM., AMERICAN BAR ASS'N YOUNG LAWYERS Div., FEDERAL REGULATION OF CONSUMER CREDIT 4.05 (1981). Truth-in-Lending requires notice of rights under

the FCBA to be provided both at the initiation of an open-end credit transaction and periodically thereafter. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1637(a)(7) (West 1982).
104. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1601(a) (West 1982). A credit card holder is entitled to statutory protection when a credit card issuer does not "correct an obvious billing error." See
Lincoln First Bank v. Carlson, 426 N.Y.S.2d 433, 436 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
105. 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(a)(1) (1984). Whether authority is actual, implied, or apparent
is a matter to be determined by state law. See id.
§ 226.13(a)(1) supp. 1 (1984) (Official Staff
Interpretations) (as amended 49 Fed. Reg. 13482, 17932, 18816 (1984)).
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transaction; 106

(3) The creditor's failure to reflect properly on a statement a payment made by the obligor or a credit issued to the obligor; °7
(4) A computation error or0 8similar error of an accounting nature of
the creditor on a statement;1
(5) A reflection on a statement of an extension of credit for which
the obligor requests additional clarification including documentary
evidence thereof;' ° 9
(6) Failure to transmit the statement required under section
1637(b) .. .to the last address of the obligor which has been disclosed to the creditor, unless that address was furnished less than
twenty days before the end of the billing cycle for which the statement
is required;' [and]
(7) Any other error described in regulations of the Board."'

C.

Defenses and Damages

The Fair Credit Billing Act also preserves consumer claims or defenses, other than tort, arising from a credit card transaction." 2
When the card issuer and seller are different entities, these defenses
are preserved if (1) the debtor has made a good faith effort to resolve the controversy with the seller; (2) the transaction amount is
greater than $50; and (3) the transaction occurred "in the same State
as the mailing address previously provided by the cardholder or was
within 100 miles from such address.""' The third factor does not
106. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1666(b)(3) (West 1982). Whether goods have been accepted is a
matter left to state law. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(a)(3) supp. 1 (1984) (Official Staff Interpretations) (as amended 49 Fed. Reg. 13482, 17932, 18816 (1984)). Disputes concerning the quality of goods which are accepted are specifically excluded from the concept of billing error.
See id.
107. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1666(b)(4) (West 1982); see also 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(a)(4)
(1984).
108. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1666(b)(5) (West 1982); see also 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(a)(5)
(1984).
109. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1666(b)(2) (West 1982); see also 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(a)(6)
(1984). A request for documentation which does not allege an error does not start the error
resolution procedure in motion. See id.
§ 226.13(a)(6) supp. 1 (1984) (Official Staff Interpretations) (as amended 49 Fed. Reg. 13482, 17932, 18816 (1984)).
110. 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(a)(7) (1984).
I11.15 U.S.C.A. § 1666(b)(6) (West 1982).
112. See id.§ 1666i(a); 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(c)(I) (1984).
113. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1666i(a)(I)-(3) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(c)(3)(ii) (1984).
This provision does not affect claims concerning billing errors asserted against the third
party credit card issuer. See Lincoln First Bank v. Carlson, 426 N.Y.S.2d 433, 436 (Sup. Ct.
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apply if the card issuer and seller are the same, or if there is one of
several types of significant affiliation between the seller and card
issuer.' 1"
Under Regulation Z, debtor liability for unauthorized credit card
use is limited to $50 as a maximum, but ceases entirely upon notice
to the issuer of loss, theft, or possible unauthorized use." 15 Regulation Z makes this section applicable to non-consumer credit card
holders unless the card issuer has issued ten or more cards for use by
employees of a single organization, in which case the parties may
contract for liability on a6 different basis from the limitations imposed by Regulation Z."1
D. Resolution of Billing Errors
Once the creditor transmits the billing statement, the consumer
has sixty days to complain about any alleged billing errors.' "7Written notification must be delivered to the creditor's address"' and
contain the following information:
(1) sets forth or otherwise enables the creditor to identify the name
and account number (if any) of the obligor,
(2) indicates the obligor's belief that the statement contains a billing error and the amount of such billing error, and
(3) sets forth the reasons for the obligor's belief (to9 the extent applicable) that the statement contains a billing error."
The creditor must send a written acknowledgment of the billing
1980). Further, if the debtor has no defense against the seller, the debtor may not assert a
defense against the third party card issuer. See Izraelewitz v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Co., 465 N.Y.S.2d 486, 488 (Civ. Ct. 1983).
114. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.12 n.26 (1984). Significant affiliation includes control of seller
by issuer, direct or indirect common control of issuer and seller, franchised dealer of card
issuer's products or services, and mail solicitation made or participated in by the issuer. See
15 U.S.C.A. § 1666i(a) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 226.12 n.26 (1984).
115. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(b)(1) (1984).
116. See id § 226.12(b)(5). In this regard, the statute applies to non-consumer transactions. See id. § 226.12(b)(5).
117. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1666(a) (West 1982).
118. See id; 12 C.F.R. § 226.7(k) (1984); id supp. 1 (1984) (Official Staff Interpretations) (as amended 49 Fed. Reg. 13482, 17932, 18816 (1984)). The creditor may stipulate
that written notice does not include anything written on the payment stub. See 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 1666(a) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(b) n.29 (1984).
119. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1666(a)(!)-(3) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(b)(l)-(3) (1984); id
§ 226.13(b)(2) supp. 1 (1984) (Official Staff Interpretations) (as amended 49 Fed. Reg. 13482,
17932, 18816 (1984)).
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error notification within thirty days of its receipt. 20 Within two billing cycles or ninety days, whichever is less, the creditor must:
(1) make corrections in the obligor's bill in accordance with the error, or (2) after conducting an investigation, send a written explanation as to why the creditor believes the bill to be correct. ' 2' Once the
above procedure has been followed, the creditor has no further responsibility unless the obligor22 makes new and different allegations
concerning the billing error.
E.

CreditorAction Concerning Disputed Charges

Although the creditor may not take action to collect the account
until he or she has complied with the correction or investigation
procedures, the creditor is not prevented from sending statements to
the obligor as long as two requirements are met.' 23 First, the creditor must not restrict or close the account for the consumer's failure
to pay the amount in dispute.' 24 Second, the creditor must explain
that payment is not required until the creditor completes the correction or investigation procedure.' 25 The creditor is also prohibited
from closing or restricting an account which contains an amount in
in
dispute, although the creditor may include the disputed amount
26
the total credit given the obligor when figuring the debt limit.' If
the creditor fails to comply with either the resolution procedures or
$50 of the
the limitations upon collection, he or she forfeits the first
27
not.'
or
due
actually
is
it
amount in dispute, whether
Once the consumer has notified the creditor of a billing error, the
120. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1666(a)(A) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(c)(1) (1984). If the
creditor complies with the error resolution procedure and investigation within the first 30
days, it is excused from providing notice of receipt of error. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1666(a)(A)
(West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(c)(2) (1984).
121. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1666(a)(3)(B) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(c)(2), (e), (f)
(1984), The creditor must give the debtor any documentary evidence requested and, if the
claimed error is indeed an error, the creditor must correct not only the incorrect charge but
also any related finance charge. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1666(a)(3)(B)(i) (West 1982). If the dispute concerns delivery of goods, the creditor cannot determine that the bill was correct until
it actually determines that the goods were delivered. See id. § 1666(a)(3)(B)(ii).
122. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1666(a) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(h) (1984).
123. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1666(c) (West 1982).
124. See id § 1666(c)(i).
125. See id § 1666(c)(2). Nevertheless, the creditor may always take necessary action
to collect any amount due that the consumer does not dispute. See id § 1666(c).
126. See id § 1666(d); 12 C.F.R. § 226.13 (d)(1) n.30 (1984).
127. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1666(e) (West 1982).
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creditor may not report or threaten to report negatively upon the
1 28
consumer's credit rating simply because of the disputed amount.
Once the resolution procedure has been completed by the creditor,
he or she must still allow the consumer the same amount of time to
pay the bill as is granted upon amounts not in dispute. 29 If the
consumer informs the creditor within the time for payment that the
amount is still in dispute, the creditor may then report the amounts
as delinquent, but only if he or she also states that the bill is disputed and also provides the consumer with the names and addresses
of each person to whom such a report has been made.130 The creditor also has a duty to report the resolution 13of any dispute to each
party to whom a delinquency was reported.'
Where a billing error is asserted, and the issuer determines that
the error occurred, appropriate credit for finance charges imposed
must be allowed. If the creditor determines that no error occurred,
and if the account is an open-end credit plan providing a time period in which the obligor may pay the amount due without the imposition of a finance charge, then the statement must be mailed at
least fourteen days prior to the date upon which payment must be
made. 132 This gives the consumer time to pay without incurring the
finance charge.
V.

FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT

Since creditors often are unable or unwilling to collect difficult or
past due claims, debts are frequently placed with, sold to, or assigned to professional debt collectors. Congress, finding that some
debt collectors use abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection
33
practices, passed the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA)
in 1977 as an amendment to the Consumer Credit Protection Act
128. See id. § 1666a(a); 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(g)(3), (4) (1984).

129. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1666a(a) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 22 6.13 (g)(2) (1984). In no
case may the creditor require payment in less than 10 days. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1666a(a)
(West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(g)(3) (1984).

130. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1666a(b) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(g)(4) (1984).
131. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1666a(c) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(g)(4) (1984).

132. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1666b (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(g) (1984).
133. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1692-1692o (West 1982 & Supp. 1984); see also Rutyna v.
Collection Accounts Terminal, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 980, 981 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (reiterating Act's
purpose). Public agencies may enforce the Act. See FTC v. Shaffner, 626 F.2d 32, 36 (7th
Cir. 1980).
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(CCPA).' 34 Administrative enforcement was assigned generally to

the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) but the Federal Reserve
Board, Comptroller, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and
other federal agencies also have enforcement powers. 135
The FDCPA does not alter or annul state laws governing debt
collection. 136 In addition, the FTC is authorized to exempt states
from application of the FDCPA, 137 but, to date, no state has been
exempted.
A.

Scope
The FDCPA protects consumers from unfair practices used to
collect debt where the debt arises from transactions in "money,
property, insurance or services . . . for personal, family, or household purposes."' 38 The FDCPA protects debtors from debt collec139
tors-not from ordinary creditors attempting to collect debt.
Debt collectors include both persons who, in interstate commerce, as
a regular part of their business collect debts of others and creditors
who collect their own debts under a different name. 40 In addition
to excluding collection efforts by creditors acting under their own
names, the statutory exclusions from the definition of debt collector
do much to temper the scope of the FDCPA. For example, governmental officials are not included, nor are attorneys who are acting
14 1
for their clients.
134. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1693r (West 1982 & Supp. 1984).
135. See id.§ 16921(a), (b). The FTC, in particular, issues advisory opinions. See id.

§ 16921(c).
136. See id § 1692n; see also TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-11.01 to -11.11, 13.01 to -13.07, -15.01 to -15.11 (Vernon Pamphlet Supp. 1984) (Texas debt collection

statutes).
137. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692o (West 1982); 16 C.F.R. § 901.6 (1984) (exemption procedures).
138. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692a(5) (West 1982).

139. See id.
§ 1692(e). "Creditor" is defined as the person extending credit or to whom
the credit is owed. See id.§ 1692a(4). A debt collector, however, cannot become a creditor

merely by receiving a transfer; transferees who receive the debt merely for collection purposes are excluded from the definition of creditor. See id.§ 1692a(4).

140. See id.
§ 1692a(6).
141. See id.§ 1692a(6). A narrow interpretation has been given to the attorney exception. See XYZ Law Firm v. FTC, 525 F. Supp. 1235, 1238 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (court allowed

FTC to investigate law firm to ensure appropriate application of attorney exception rather
than debt collection business cloaked with law firm ownership); see also Gary v. Spires, 473

F. Supp. 878, 881 (D.S.C. 1979) (administrator of check clearing house not debt collector);
Heredia v. Green, 504 F. Supp. 896, 900 (E.D. Pa. 1980), ajf'd, 667 F.2d 392 (3d Cir. 1981)
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Since the FDCPA is largely concerned with preventing harassment, communication is controlled and defined broadly as "the conveying of information regarding142 a debt directly or indirectly to any
person through any medium."'
B.

Limitations on Communications

The FDCPA places limitations upon communications by debt
collectors with the debtor and third parties. 43 Where it is necessary
to seek location information from third parties, the debt collector
must identify himself, but not his employer, unless specifically requested, and state that he is seeking location information about the
consumer.'44 The debt collector must not: (1) state that the con-

sumer owes a debt; (2) communicate more than once with the third
party, unless asked to do so or unless he reasonably believes the
earlier responses were erroneous and that the third party now has
accurate or complete information; (3) "communicate by post card";
(4) use words or symbols in written communications that would reveal the occupation of the debt collector or that the communication
concerns debt; and (5) where the collector knows that the debtor is
represented by counsel, communicate with any third party other
than the attorney, unless, within a reasonable time, the attorney has
not responded to the creditor's communications. 4 5 The debtor,
however, may give prior consent to other communications with
third parties concerning the debt itself.' 46 A court may grant authority to communicate with third parties in connection with the
post-judgment collection process.
Direct communication with the debtor is also limited. Once located, the consumer, spouse, and, if the debtor is a minor, parent or
(Landlord & Tenant Officer of municipal court not debt collector because agent of court).
See generally Lewis, Regulation ofAttorney Debt Collectors-The Role of the FTC and the
Bar, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 669, 669-703 (1984) (analysis of attorney debt collector conduct).
142. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692a(2) (West 1982). In order to communicate, it is necessary

to locate the debtor, and the FDCPA defines location information as information concerning "a consumer's place of abode and his telephone number at such place, or his place of
employment." See id.
§ 1692(a)(7).
143. See id § 1692b.

144. See id § 1692b(l).
145. See id § 1692b(2)-(6). There appears to be no case law concerning these provisions, which would indicate that either collection agencies rarely violate this provision or

that the public is unaware of its existence.
146. See id.§ 1692c(b).
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guardian, are shielded from: (1) communications at unusual or inconvenient times and places; (2) direct communications if the consumer is known to be represented by an attorney "with respect to
such debt," unless the attorney consents to direct communication or
does not answer the communication; and (3) communications at a
place of employment if the collector knows the employer forbids
such communications. 147
Finally, if a consumer gives the collector written notice that he or
she refuses to pay or wishes the collector to cease further communication, the collector may thereafter only communicate to inform the
being terminated or that specific
consumer that collection efforts are
4
1
sought.'
be
remedies may or will
Impermissible Communications and ProhibitedPractices
Even if communication itself is authorized, a communication may
be prohibited if it is abusive or false. 149 In addition to prohibited
communications, the FDCPA prohibits other practices, regardless of
C.

147. See id. § 1692c(a), (d). Communications between 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 p.m. are presumed reasonable unless the collector has knowledge to the contrary. See id. § 1692c(a)(1);
see also Harvey v. United Adjusters, 509 F. Supp. 1218, 1221 (D. Or. 1981) (creditor communicated with debtor after learning debtor represented by attorney).
148. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692c(c) (West 1982).
149. See id §§ 1692d, 1692e. The FDCPA contains a general prohibition against
"conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress or abuse." See id.
§ 1692d. Examples of such conduct include:
(1) The use or threat . . . of violence or other criminal means to harm the physical
person, reputation, or property ....
(2) The use of obscene or profane language [including abusive language] ....
(3) The publication of a list of consumers who allegedly refuse to pay debts, except [as
permitted under the Fair Credit Reporting Act] ....
(4) The advertisement for sale of any debt to coerce payment of the debt.
(5) [The use of the telephone] . . . repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy,
abuse, or harass . ...
(6) [Making] telephone calls without disclosure of. . . identity.
Id § 1692d(I)-(6). The telephone call seems to generate the most litigation since debt collectors find it a natural tool for harassment. See Harvey v. United Adjusters, 509 F. Supp.
1218, 1221 (D. Or. 1981); Bingham v. Collection Bureau, 505 F. Supp. 864, 874 (D.N.D.
1981). Making false or misleading representations is also prohibited. See 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 1692e (West 1982). Examples include falsely invoking the authority of a state, the United
States, or any court or official, false representations that the collector is or the communication is from an attorney, and threats of legal action that the collector does not intend to
pursue or cannot legally pursue. See id. It is not a misrepresentation to state that failure to
pay will affect a debtor's credit rating. See Harvey v. United Adjusters, 509 F. Supp. 1218,
1221 (D. Or. 1981). However, threats to contact employers are actionable. See Rutyna v.
Collection Accounts Terminal, 478 F. Supp. 980, 982 (N.D. 11. 1979).
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whether such conduct might be considered communication. Congress was specifically concerned with outlawing "unfair or unconscionable" collection practices. 5 0° The FDCPA prohibition against
misleading forms applies not only to the debt collector, but also to
anyone who designs, compiles, or furnishes forms. 5 '
D.

Validation of Debt

The FDCPA places an affirmative duty on the debt collector to
give the debtor enough information to enable the consumer to evaluate and determine the validity of a claim.' 5 2 If the original demand letter or other communication does not contain this
information, and if the consumer does not immediately pay, the colthe amount due and
lector must provide written notice containing
53
days.1
five
within
the name of the creditor
Where the consumer disputes the validity of any portion of the
debt or requests the name of the original creditor, the debt collector
must cease collection attempts until after the appropriate validation
or name is mailed to the debtor. 154 Where a debt collector is collecting multiple debts and the consumer makes one55payment, the proceeds may be applied only to undisputed debt.'
150. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692f (West 1982). Examples listed include: (1) attempts to
collect amounts, including fees, costs or charges, not authorized by the agreements or not
permitted by law; (2) acceptance of instruments "postdated more than five days" unless the
collector is willing to give notice "not more than ten nor less than three business days prior"
to depositing the postdated instrument; (3) solicitation of postdated instruments for subsequent use in a criminal proceeding or for use as a threat for such prosecution. See id (additional practices prohibited). A mere return address showing the defendant to be a debt
collector violates the section. See Rutyna v. Collection Accounts Terminal, 478 F. Supp.
980, 982 (N.D. I11.1979).
151. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692j (West 1982). Misleading forms are those which imply
that a third party, for example, the government, is involved in the collection attempt when
the third party is not actually involved. See id § 1692j.
152. See id § 1692g.
153. See id § 1692g(a). The written notice must also inform the consumer that he or
she has 30 days from receipt to object to validity. See id § 1692g(a). The notice must also
tell the consumer that if the objections are received in writing, the collector will validate the
debt and forward verification to the consumer. See id § 1692g(a). Finally, the notice must
state that the collector will, upon request, provide the name of the original creditor within 30
days. See id § 1692g(a); see also Bingham v. Collection Bureau, 505 F. Supp. 864, 871
(D.N.D. 1981) (30-day notice must be contained in first mailing); Ost v. Collection Bureau,
493 F. Supp. 701, 703-04 (D.N.D. 1980) (violation where series of demands made prior to
notice, or if notice on back of form).
154. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692g(b) (West 1982).
155. See id § 1692h.
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E. Legal Action by Debt Collectors
Debt collectors frequently bring legal actions upon debt. To prevent abuse of the legal process, the FDCPA limits venue by setting
venue either where real property securing the debt is located or at
the place where the contract was signed or where the consumer
resides.' 56
F. Damages
Violations of the FDCPA may be enforced in the federal courts or
in any competent state court without reference to the amount in
controversy.' 57 Recovery of actual damages and attorneys' fees are
the basic remedies provided, but punitive damages of not more than
$1,000 may also be assessed in individual cases dependent upon the
frequency, willfullness, and persistence of the violation.5 8 Actual
damages may include mental anguish, if recoverable at state law. 59
However, actual damages need not be shown in order to recover
60
punitive damages.
G. Defenses, Counterclaims,and Limitations
The FDCPA provides two basic affirmative defenses: unintentional violation resulting from a genuine error, and good faith compliance with FTC opinions.' 6' The collector may also counterclaim
156. See id § 1692i. For example, the consumer may reside in City A. The collector
may have an office in City B, which is 200 miles away. Ordinarily venue for debt action
would lie at the place where the contract was made or at a place designated by the contract.
By contractually setting venue in City B, the creditor or subsequent debt collector can frequently ensure a default. Texas, however, has abolished this practice. See TEX REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 1995 § 3(e)(2) (Vernon Pamphlet Supp. 1984).
157. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692k(d) (West 1982).
158. See id § 1692k(b). Punitive damages may not exceed "$ 1,000 per transaction or
communication," and the full award of $1,000 should be made only in the case of persistent,
illegal activity. See Harvey v. United Adjusters, 509 F. Supp. 1218, 1222 (D. Or. 1981).
Punitive damages in class actions are limited to the lesser of one percent of the collector's net
worth or $500,000. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692k(a)(2) (West 1982). If the amount in controversy is not large, the offsetting punitive damages claim may well exceed the debt, a situation
that makes violations of the FDCPA quite risky. Unfortunately, the unsophisticated small
consumer-debtor, the very person Congress intended to protect, may never retain counsel
capable of asserting the rights created by the statute.
159. See Carrigan v. Central Adjustment Bureau, 502 F. Supp. 468, 470 (N.D. Ga.
1980).
160. See Harvey v. United Adjusters, 509 F. Supp. 1218, 1222 (D. Or. 1981).
161. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692k(c), (e) (West 1982). Maintenance of procedures to pre-
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for and recover costs and attorneys' fees if the debt collector can

show that the FDCPA claim was a bad faith action raised solely to
harass the debt collector. 162 Limitations run after one year follow163
ing the violation date.
VI.

ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFER ACT AND REGULATION

E

The advent of wholly electronic financial transactions, completely
undocumented by any form of written memorial, revealed a major
gap in federal and state legal codes. For example, such transactions
are not governed by articles three and four of the Uniform Commercial Code because transactions under those statutes require
some type of instrument.' 64 Traditional common law governing
debt instruments is also premised upon the existence of some writing.' 65 In response, Congress enacted the Electronic Fund Transfer
Act (EFTA) 66 , in 1978, and authorized the Federal Reserve Board
to issue regulations, which ultimately were promulgated as Regulation E.' 67 The EFTA and Regulation E apply to both consumer and
non-consumer transactions by natural persons 68 and apply to both
financial institutions and others offering electronic fund transfer
69
accounts.

vent error is part of the debt collector's burden of proof. See id. § 1692k(c). However, reliance on advice of counsel is not a sufficient defense. See Baker v. G.C. Servs. Corp., 677
F.2d 775, 779 (9th Cir. 1982).
162. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692k(a)(3) (West 1982). Courts are divided as to whether a
counterclaim on underlying debt is a compulsory counterclaim. Compare Plant v. Blazer
Fin. Servs., 598 F.2d 1357, 1360-63 (5th Cir. 1979) (in Fifth Circuit, action on underlying
debt is compulsory counterclaim to original action under Truth-in-Lending Act) with Valencia v. Anderson Bros. Ford, 617 F.2d 1278, 1290-92 (7th Cir. 1980) (expressly rejecting
Plant).
163. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692k(d) (West 1982).
164. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.104, 4.102(b), 4.104(a)(7) (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1968). At present, the UCC is being revised so that new articles 3 and 4, or their
replacement articles, will also cover electronic fund transfers.
165. See, e.g., Wexel v. Cameron Grier & Co., 31 Tex. 614, 617 (1869) ("promissory
note is. . . written engagement by one person to pay another person"); Mashek v. Leonard,
186 S.W.2d 745, 746 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1945, writ dism'd) (" 'check is simply a
written order of a depositor to his bank to make a certain payment' "); Vaughn v. Farmers'
& Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 126 S.W. 690, 691 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910, writ refd) (" 'bill of
exchange is a written order' ").
166. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1693-1693r (West 1982 & Supp. 1984).
167. See 12 C.F.R. § 205 (1984).
168. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1693a(5) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 2 05.2(g) (1984).
169. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1693b(d) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 205.1(b) (1984).
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The EFTA provides limitations on liability for unauthorized
transfers, requires disclosure of terms regulating the consumer's account, and regulates error resolution. 170 The EFTA contains two
separate provisions for damages: one for actual damages where an
electronic transfer account holder does not properly make or stop a
transfer'7 72, and one for damages for failure to correct an error in the
account.
A.

TransactionsAffected

The term "electronic fund transfer" is defined in the EFTA and
Regulation E as a transaction not originated by a traditional instrument but initiated using "an electronic terminal, telephonic instrument, or computer or magnetic tape . . . to order, instruct or
authorize . . . [the] debit or credit" of an account. 173 The EFTA
excludes more traditional transactions even though an electronic or
telephonic component is present. 7 4 Some examples of exclusions
are check authorization, automated clearing house transactions, securities transactions, preauthorized automatic savings transfers to
demand deposit accounts, simple telephonic instructions made by
the consumer to his or her bank, trust account transactions, and wire
transfers.
'15

B.

Required Disclosures

At the initiation of a contract for an electronic fund transfer service, the EFTA and Regulation E require that certain disclosures be
made, including: (1) liability for unauthorized use; (2) telephone
number and address for notification in the event of unauthorized
use; (3) type, nature, and limitations upon transfers which may be
made; (4) charges for use; (5) right to stop payment of preauthorized
transfers and procedures involved; (6) right to receive documentation of all transfers; (7) summary of the error resolution methods
170. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1693c, 1693f, 1693g (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. §§ 205.6, .7, .11
(1984).
171. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1693h(a) (West 1982).

172. See id § 1693m(a).
173. See id § 1693a(6); 12 C.F.R. § 205.2(h) (1984).
174. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1693a(6) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 205.3 (1984).
175. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1693a(6) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 205.3 (1984); see also Kashanchi v. Texas Commerce Medical Bank, 703 F.2d 936, 942 (5th Cir. 1983) (telephone transfer "which was not made pursuant to a prearranged plan" not governed by EFTA).
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provided for by the FRB; (8) summary of the institution's liability to
the consumer for damages; (9) circumstances under which the customer's account information will be disclosed
to third persons; and
76
institution.
the
of
(10) business days
After the account is opened, the institution must provide disclosure of current FRB regulations dealing with error resolution on an
annual basis.77 Additional disclosures are required each time there
is a change of any term or condition 78of the consumer's account
which would increase cost or liability.
C. Documentation
At least quarterly, but generally monthly, documentation must be
provided which shows: (1) amount and date of each transfer;
(2) type of transfer; (3) identity of consumer's account; (4) identity
of any third-party transferee; (5) "location or identification of the
electronic terminal involved"; (6) fees charged by the institution;
(7) opening and closing account balances; and (8) address and telephone number for error inquiries. 179 Items one through five above
must also be available to the consumer, "directly or indirectly," in
written form at the time a transfer is initiated from an electronic
terminal. 180
D. PreauthorizedTransfers and Access CardIssuance
Preauthorized transfers require written consumer authorization,
with a copy of the authorization provided to the consumer.' 8' Such
transfers are subject to stop payment orders made at least three days
before the scheduled transfer. 8 2 Disclosure of the transactions must
83
be made after the transfer under a preauthorization agreement.
Access cards, numbers, and codes may be issued only on request
176. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1693c(a) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 205.7(a)(1)-(10) (1984); see
also Ognibene v. Citibank, 446 N.Y.S.2d 845, 847 (Civ. Ct. 1981) (bank may not seek recovery for unauthorized use unless it shows required disclosures have been made).
177. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1693c(a)(7) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 205.8(b) (1984).

178. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1693c(b) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 205.8(a) (1984).
179. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1693d(a), (c) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 205.9(b)(1)-(6) (1984).

180. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1693d(a) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 205.9(a)(1)-(6) (1984).
181. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1693e(a) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 205.10(c) (1984).
182. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1693e(a) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 205.10(c) (1984).
183. See 12 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(1), (2) (1984).
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or for renewal. 184 However, access mechanisms may be distributed

on an unsolicited basis if the access mechanism is not validated and
may only be validated later upon consumer request. 85 A method
for invalidation is described, but if validation occurs, then disclosure
86
of terms and liabilities is required.
E.

Consumer Liabilityfor Unauthorized Transfers

Consumer liability for unauthorized transfers is limited. The statute contains a general limitation of the lesser of $50 or the amount
actually transferred prior to notice of unauthorized use. 87 A consumer has sixty days after receipt of a periodic statement to discover
an unauthorized transaction. 88 If the consumer's access mechanism
has been stolen, he has two business days to report the loss or
theft. 8 9 Failure to discover unauthorized use, theft, or loss entitles
the institution to charge the consumer's account up to $500 for its
losses actually incurred because of the consumer's neligence.' 90
F. Error Resolution

If a consumer desires to object to any error' 9' or unauthorized
184. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1693i(a) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 205.5(a)(1)-(3) (1984).
185. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1693i(b) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 205.5(b)(!)-(4) (1984).
186. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1693i(b) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 205.5(b)(1)-(4) (1984).
187. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1693g(a)(I), (2) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 205.6(b) (1984). Notice is defined as taking steps "reasonably required in the ordinary course of business to
provide the . . . institution with the pertinent information, whether or not any particular
officer, employee or agent" actually receives the information. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1693g(a)(2)
(West 1982). The burden is initially on the bank to show the transfer to have been authorized. See Ognibene v. Citibank, 446 N.Y.S.2d 845, 848 (Civ. Ct. 1981). Once the bank
makes such a showing, the burden shifts to the consumer to rebut by showing lack of authorization. See id at 847. There is a growing concern for customers forced to use access cards
at gunpoint or robbed as they leave an access terminal; but, there are no reported decisions
or FRB interpretive opinions as of this writing.
188. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1693g(a) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 205.6(b)(2) (1984).
189. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1693g(a) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 205.6(b)(1) (1984).
190. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1693g(a) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 205.6(b) (1984). The 2and 60-day notice requirements are removed by "extenuating circumstances such as extended travel or hospitalization." See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1693g(a) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R.
§ 205.6(b)(4) (1984). The burden of showing unauthorized use or loss caused by the customer's negligence is on the institution which must show, as a predicate, that all required
disclosures were made. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1693g(b) (West 1982).
191. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1693f(f) (West 1982). Regulation E defines "error" as:
(1) A (sic) unauthorized electronic fund transfer;
(2) An incorrect electronic fund transfer to or from the consumer's account;
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use, he must give oral or written notice within sixty days of transmission of a periodic statement reflecting the error or unauthorized
use.' 92 The notice must include an identification of the consumer
and his account number, a statement that the customer believes that
there is an error, and the reasons for that belief.' 93 Written confirmation of an oral notice may be required as long as the consumer is
so advised. 94
Immediate investigation of the error is required and a report must
be mailed to the consumer within ten business days after the institution has been notified.' 9 The institution may provisionally recredit
the consumer's account for the amount of the error minus the $50
limitation.' 96 Should the institution elect to recredit, it has forty-five
days to conclude its investigation.' 97 If written confirmation by the
consumer is requested and not received, the institution may take
forty-five days to finish the inquiry without recrediting.' 98
If an error is discovered, the account must be corrected within one
business day of discovery' 99, and the consumer must be notified by
report.2° If the institution does not discover an error and desires to
contest the consumer's allegations, the consumer must be notified
within three days of that decision. 2° ' When no error is discovered,
(3) The omission from a periodic statement of an electronic fund transfer to or from the
consumer's account that should have been included;
(4) A computational or bookkeeping error...;
(5) The consumer's receipt of an incorrect amount of money from an electronic
terminal;
(6) An electronic fund transfer not identified...
(7) A consumer's request for . . . documentation, information or clarification . . .
[which] includes any request for documentation, information, or clarification in order to
assert an error . . . [but] does not include a routine inquiry about the balance in the
consumer's account or a request for duplicate copies of documentation or other information that is made only for tax or other record-keeping purposes.
12 C.F.R. § 205.1 l(a) (1984).
192. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1693f(a) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 205.11(b)(1)(i) (1984).
193. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1693f(a) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 205.11(b)(I)(ii), (iii) (1984).
194. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1693f(a) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 205.1 l(b)(2) (1984). Failure
of the customer to make written confirmation may limit the institution's liability. See 15
U.S.C.A. § 1693f(a) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 205.1 I(b)(2) (1984).
195. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1693f(a) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 205.11(c) (1984).
196. See 12 C.F.R. § 205.11(c)(2)(i) (1984).
197. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1693f(c) (West 1982).
198. See id. § 1693f(a).
199. See id.§ 1693f(b); 12 C.F.R. § 205.1l(e)(I) (1984).
200. See 12 C.F.R. § 205.1 l(e)(2) (1984).
201. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1693f(d) (West 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 205.11 (f)(I) (1984). The deci-
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the provisional credit may not be withdrawn for five days.202 The
institution has no further statutory duty, even when the consumer
continues to assert the error.2 °3
G. InstitutionalLiability and Limitations
Civil liability for billing errors includes actual damages, attorneys' fees, and costs. 204 Whether or not there are actual damages, a
successful consumer must be awarded damages of at least $100, but
no more than $1,000.205 The amount awarded in the range between
$100 and $1,000 is determined by reference to the frequency, persistence, and nature of the noncompliance.20 6 However, if the court
finds that there was an error in a billing dispute, the court may
treble actual damages if:
(1) the financial institution did not provisionally recredit the account within the ten day period.

. .;

and...

(A) did not make a good faith investigation. . .; or
(B) did not have a reasonable basis for . . . [denying the] error;

or
(2) the financial institution knowingly and willfully. . . [refused to
acknowledge an] error.20 7
The limitations period for any action on an error alleging treble
damages is one year from the date of occurrence.20 8
The financial institution may be liable to its consumer for mistakes which cause actual damages. 20 9 Actual damages are allowed
for failure to make an authorized transfer, failure to credit an account which later results in a refusal to make an authorized transfer,
and failure to stop payment.210 Violation of any provision of the
EFTA, not merely regarding billing errors and mistakes, generally
sion is limited by the maximum 10 and 45 day periods. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1693f(a), (c)
(West 1982). If the consumer requests an explanation, the institution must document and
explain its findings. See id § 1693f(d); 12 C.F.R. § 205.11(t)(1) (1984).
202. See 12 C.F.R. § 205.1 i(f)(2)(ii) (1984).
203. See id § 205.1 1(h) (1984).
204. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1693m(a)(I), (3) (West 1982).
205. See id. § 1693m(a)(2)(A).
206. See id § 1693m(b)(I).
207. See id. § 1693f(e).
208. See id. § 1693m(g).
209. See id § 1693h(a).
210. See id. § 1693h(a)(i)-(3). The exceptions occur when:
(A) the consumer's account has insufficient funds;
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incurs the same liability as billing errors. 21 ' There is no liability if
the failure resulted from an act of God or "technical malfunction
which was known to the consumer at the time" he tried to make the
transfer.21 2 Lack of intent on the part of the institution is not a defense under this provision; therefore, a consumer may recover for a
bona fide error.2 1 3 The limitations period would appear to be one
year.214
VII.

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT AND REGULATIONS

Although the Federal Trade Commission Act 2 15 has been in force
since 1914, it was not until the 1970's that the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) attempted to regulate consumer debt arrangements.21 6
A.

FTC Regulation of Door-to-DoorSales

In 1972, the FTC promulgated a rule making it an "unfair and
deceptive act or practice for any seller to" fail to give the buyer notice of the buyer's right to cancel any door-to-door sale transaction
within three days of the date of the sale.2 1 7 The door-to-door seller
must furnish the buyer with a notice of cancellation which is in(B) the funds are subject to legal process or other encumbrance restricting such
transfer;
(C) such transfer would exceed an established credit limit;
(D) an electronic terminal has insufficient cash to complete the transaction; or
(E) as otherwise provided in regulations of the Board.
Id. § 1693h(a)(1).
211. See id § 1693m(a). A defendant may recover attorneys' fees and costs if an action
for civil liability is brought in bad faith. See id. § 1693m(f). Class actions will lie for general
civil liability and billing error claims, but treble damages are not recoverable. See id
§§ 1693f(e), 1693m(a)(2)(B). A class may recover up to one percent of the defendant's net
worth but no more than $500,000. See id § 1693m(a)(2)(B). Frequency and number of
consumers affected are factors considered in determining the award in a class action. See id.
§ 1693m(b)(2).
212. See id. § 1693h(b).
213. See id § 1693h(c).
214. There is no limitations period set forth in § 1693h; therefore, the limitations period
in § 1693m(g) apparently controls. See id § 1693m(g).
215. Id §§ 41-77 (West 1982 & Supp. 1984).
216. See id. § 45. In 1972 and 1975, the FTC promulgated two rules dealing directly
with consumer debt creation. See Cooling-Off Period For Door-to-Door Sales, 16 C.F.R.
§ 429 (1984); Preservation Of Consumers' Claims And Defenses, 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1984).
217. See 16 C.F.R. § 429.1(a) (1984).
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cluded in a form to be used by the buyer to cancel the transaction.21 8
Should the buyer cancel the transaction, the seller is obligated to
retrieve the goods from the buyer within twenty days at its own expense and risk. 2 ' 9 Failure to retrieve the goods entitles the buyer to

retain the goods without any further obligation. 220 The FTC rule
applies only to door-to-door sales and only to the sale of consumer
goods. 22 1 The rule does not annul or negate any state law which

also governs door-to-door sales.2 22

FTC Holder in Due Course Regulation
In 1975, the FTC promulgated a rule entitled "Preservation of
Consumer's Claims and Defenses," generally referred to as the FTC
holder in due course rule.223 On its face, the FTC rule does much to
negate the concept of holder in due course, which is firmly established in the law under the Uniform Commercial Code. 24 Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, the holder in due course of a negotiable instrument takes the instrument free of all defenses, except
certain real defenses, which might be asserted by the obligor of the
negotiable instrument.225 In many cases, consumers execute notes to
finance purchases of property and services. The seller of the goods
subsequently sells the note or debt instrument to a third party.
Should the consumer later have a dispute with the seller, he or she
cannot assert any defense concerning the seller's obligations or performance in an action upon the underlying debt instrument now
held by the the third party.
The FTC rule changes this traditional law of negotiable instruments by making it an "unfair or deceptive practice" to attempt to
B.

218. See id §429.1(b).
219. See id § 429.1(b).
220. See id § 429.1(b).
221. See id § 429.1 n.l.
222. See id § 429.1 n.2. In Texas, rescission of a door-to-door sale of house siding
was allowed under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. See Charping v. Light, 578
S.W.2d 462, 463-65 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, no writ).
223. See Preservation Of Consumers' Claims And Defenses, 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1984).
224. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3-302 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). As of the
promulgation date of the rule, only six states had not amended holder in due course statutes

to permit some right on the consumer's part to assert a grievance arising out of a sale against
a creditor which had financed the sales transaction. See Comment, The FTC Holder in Due
Course Rule. Neither Creditor Ruination Nor Consumer Salvation, 31 Sw. L.J. 1097, 1103
(1977).
225. See TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 3-305 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
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transfer debt instruments executed by consumers in consumer transactions free of defenses to holders in due course. 226 Further, the
original debt instrument must disclose to the consumer that he or
she retains such defenses against any holder.227 The rule applies to
lenders who are not sellers if a seller has referred the buyer to the
lender or in cases where the seller and the lender are affiliated.228
The actual seller is required to make certain that the lender's contract with the buyer contains the appropriate notice.229
The FTC rule does not truly create a private right of action
against a holder in due course. Rather, if a holder in due course
asserts a claim under the instrument which represents the underlying indebtedness resulting from a consumer transaction, the consumer may interpose any claim as a defense and offset which he or
she might have had in an action by the original seller. Therefore,
the rule permits a consumer to assert, as a defense or offset, personal
defenses, such as breach of warranty, failure of consideration, and
defects in the goods in an action on a debt.
The rule does not necessarily protect a consumer where a seller
transfers a negotiable instrument not containing the required notice
to an innocent holder in due course. The Louisiana Supreme Court
has held that, while such omission may be actionable against the
seller or other party drafting the instrument, the innocent holder is
not affected.23°
C. FTC Credit Practices Rule
In February 1984, the FTC issued its new Credit Practices
Rule,2 3 which becomes effective March 1, 1985.232 The rule is
226. See 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1984).
227. See id. Two cases dealing with non-consumer transactions, in which the notice
required by the FTC for consumer transactions was inadvertently included, have split as to
whether the notice and FTC rule are inapplicable. Compare International Harvester Credit
Corp. v. Evans, 484 F. Supp. i, 3-4 (W.D. Okla. 1978) (inclusion does not constitute agreement that transaction is a consumer transaction) with Jefferson Bank & Trust v. Stamatiou,
384 So. 2d 388, 391-92 (La. 1980) (even though not consumer contract, language became
part of transaction).
228. See 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(c), (d) (1984).
229. See id. § 433.2. Failure to include the notice is a violation by the seller, not the
third-party lender. See id. § 433.2.
230. See Capital Bank & Trust v. Lacey, 393 So. 2d 668, 669 (La. 1980).
231. See Federal Trade Commission Trade Regulation Rule on Credit Practices, [Consumer Credit] INSTALMENT CRED. GUIDE (CCH) No. 409, at 98-100 (Mar. 13, 1984).
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designed to drastically alter consumer credit transactions by:
(1) abolishing cognovit or confession of judgment clauses, as well as
similar clauses waiving notice of suit;233 (2) limiting waivers of ex234
emptions except where property is "subject to a security interest";
(3) limiting wage assignments; 235 (4) abolishing non-purchase
236
money, "non-possessory security interests in household goods";
(5) prohibiting misrepresentation and requiring clear disclosures to
cosigners, particularly of open-ended credit arrangements; 237 and
(6) abolishing the "pyramiding of' late charges assessed against a
timely installment payment because an earlier installment was assessed a late fee or delinquency charge.238
232. See id. at i. The FTC has acted because consumers are unable to bargain away
boilerplate contractual provisions since the universal use of standard contracts makes that
virtually impossible. See id. at 12-14. The FTC believes that most consumers are not sophisticated enough to understand and bargain for cancellation of the clauses which it abolishes or limits by this rule. See id. at 14-15.
233. See 49 Fed. Reg. 7789 (1984) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a)(1)). Cognovit
and confession of judgment clauses are synonymous.
234. See id. at 7789 (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a)(2)). The ban on waivers of
exemptions has no impact in Texas where homestead real property is concerned, since Texas
does not permit waivers of the homestead exemption. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002
(Vernon Pamphlet Supp. 1984). In addition, most states prohibit waivers of exemptions in
personal property except where specific property is given as security for a loan. See Federal
Trade Commission Trade Regulation Rule on Credit Practices, [Consumer Credit] INSTALMENT CRED. GUIDE (CCH) No. 409, at 57 (Mar. 13, 1984).

235. See 49 Fed. Reg. 7789 (1984) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a)(3)).
236. See id at 7789 (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a)(4)). The term "household
goods" means ordinary personal effects and wedding rings, but does not include: "(1) works
of art; (2) electronic entertainment equipment (except one television and one radio); (3)
items acquired as antiques [items more than one hundred years old]; and (4) jewelry (except
wedding rings)." See id at 7789 (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 444.1(i)).
237. See id. at 7790 (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 444.3(a)). The rule defines a cosigner
as "a natural person who renders himself or herself liable for the obligation of another
person without compensation." Id. at 7789 (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 444.1 (k)). Cosignors must be natural persons, but the term does not include a spouse whose signature is
necessary to enable perfection of a security interest. See id. at 7789 (to be codified at 16
C.F.R. § 444.1(k)).
238. See id. at 7790 (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 444.3(a)). The FTC compares standard accounting practice with the prohibited practice as follows:
The general accounting principal is that payment is first applied to any outstanding late
charge, then to the interest charge, and finally to the principal amount of that payment.
In "pyramiding" the accounting method works in this fashion: If a consumer's payment is due on the first day of January, for example, and the payment is not made until
the 20th day of that month, the creditor assesses a late charge, for example, $5. The
February payment and all subsequent payments are made on time. However, by allocating $5 of the February payment to the January late charge and only the remainder to
the February payment, the creditor causes the February payment to be $5 "short,"
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1. Scope
The new rule applies only to consumer credit transactions in or
affecting interstate commerce. 239 Lenders and retail instalment sellers are affected.24°
2. Cognovit Clauses
Consumer transactions now may no longer include cognovit

clauses. 241 The FTC action followed the United States Supreme

Court ruling in Swarb v. Lennox, 242 which held that a Pennsylvania
judgment statute was an unconstitutional
cognovit or confession24of
3
denial of due process.

3. Wage Assignments
Wage assignments will be permitted under the rule only if they
are: (1) revocable at will; (2) a preauthorized wage deduction used
as a vehicle for payments on the original transaction; or (3) wages
earned prior to assignment. 2 "
hence delinquent. Timely payments in succeeding months are given the same treatment, so that there is a delinquency or late charge for each month. The cumulation
impact of repetitive late charges can be substantial.
Federal Trade Commission Trade Regulation Rule on Credit Practices, [Consumer Credit]
INSTALMENT CRED. GUIDE

(CCH) No. 409, at 64 (Mar. 13, 1984). Texas presently limits

delinquency charges to 5%or $5 of each delinquent installment past due more than 10 days.
See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-6.02(11) (Vernon 1971).
239. See 49 Fed. Reg. 7789 (1984) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a)).
240. See id at 7789-90 (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. §§ 444.2(a), 444.3(a)).
241. See id at 7789 (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a)(1)).
242. 405 U.S. 191 (1972). In a companion case, the Court upheld contractual cognovit
clauses between commercial parties of equal bargaining power. See D.H. Overmyer Co. v.
Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187-88 (1972). However, neither case addressed purely contractual
arrangements between lenders and consumer debtors. Cf. Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191,
201 (1972) (state cognovit statute not unconstitutional on its face); D.H. Overmyer Co. v.
Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187-88 (1972) (when parties at arm's length, cognovit clause valid).
243. See Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191, 199 (1972) (unconstitutional denial of due
process).
244. 49 Fed. Reg. 7789 (1984) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(3)). States, including
Texas, which have adopted the Uniform Commercial Code, or similar statutes, generally
prohibit wage assignments. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-3.20(1) (Vernon Pamphlet Supp. 1984); id art. 5069-4.04(1) (Vernon 1971); Federal Trade Commission Trade

Regulation Rule on Credit Practices, [Consumer Credit]

INSTALMENT CRED. GUIDE

(CCH)

No. 409, at 33 n.1, n.2 (Mar. 13, 1984).
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Non-Possessory, Non-Purchase Money Security Interests

The most interesting and important change in general law is 16
C.F.R. § 444.2(4), which prohibits non-possessory, non-purchase
money security interests in household goods. At present, most
states, including Texas, recognize these interests. The FTC has determined that such liens are of little value to lenders, for little is
realized on resale of such collateral. However, these liens for household goods give real and psychological leverage to the lender, because the household goods have special real or emotional
significance to the consumer.245
5.

Cosigners

The new cosigner provision is basically a disclosure rule. It applies only where the cosigner is a natural person and the transaction
is one involving consumer credit in interstate commerce.246 The
rule prohibits direct and indirect misrepresentation and requires disclosure of the nature of his or her obligation prior to the time the
cosigner is obligated. 241 If open-end credit is involved, disclosure
must be made prior to the time the cosigner's agreement is executed.248 No lender liability is incurred if the lender gives the cosigner the required notice of his or her payment liability in the form
of a separate document.249
VIII.

CONCLUSION

This article should serve to generally familiarize the practitioner
with the area of federal regulation of consumer debt creation and
245. See Federal Trade Commission Trade Regulation Rule on Credit Practices, [Consumer Credit] INSTALMENT CRED. GUIDE (CCH) No. 409, at 47 (Mar. 13, 1984). Lenders
use these liens as leverage to ensure repayment. See id at 48. Congress reached similar
conclusions when it enacted § 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, which permits individual debtors in bankruptcy cases to avoid non-purchase money, non-possessory liens on
certain categories of exempt property, including household goods and personal effects. See
II U.S.C.A. § 522(f) (West 1979). The Fifth Circuit, however, has not applied the statute
according to congressional intent, holding that where a state permits such liens to be created,
as most states do, the property is no longer exempt at state law. That is, the lien does not
impair an exemption since the exemption does not exist. See In re Allen, 725 F.2d 290, 293
(5th Cir. 1984).
246. See 49 Fed. Reg. 7789-90 (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. §§ 444.1(k), 444.3(a)(I)).
247. See id at 7790 (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 444.3(a)(1)).
248. See id. at 7790 (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 444.3(a)(2)).
249. See id. at 7790 (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 444.3(a)-(c)).
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collection beyond truth-in-lending and simplify the applicable statutes and regulations. Most of the sections contain checklists of important items which should assist the practitioner in a thorough
analysis of a situation involving consumer debt.
This article, intended as a review for the practicing attorney, provides information to trigger recognition of potential issues which
arise in daily practice. Once an issue is identifed, a review of the
text and footnotes will lead the reader to appropriate statutory and
case law as well as applicable regulations.250
Rapid development continues in this area of federal regulation,
following the trend of the past seventeen years, during which federal
regulation has grown from minimal guidance to arguably excessive
control. For example, the proposed Tenant Credit Reporting Act,
pending before Congress at the time of this writing, would regulate
consumer reports on individuals renting residential real property.25 '
Perhaps the best way to conclude this article and clearly reiterate
its purpose is to quote Chief Judge Clark of the Fifth Circuit, discussing the Truth-in-Lending Act: "The scheme of the statute is to
create a system of private attorneys general to aid its enforcement,
should be construed liberally in light of its remeand its language
'
dial purpose. 252

250. Additional sources are recommended for more detailed research. See 1-5 CON(CCH) (1976); 1,2 R. CLONTZ, TRUTH-IN-LENDING MANUAL (5th ed.
1982 & Supp. 1984).

SUMER CRED. GUIDE

251. See H.R. 5942, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).

252. See McGowan v. King, Inc., 569 F.2d 845, 848 (5th Cir. 1978). The quote is not
included to reflect a pro-plaintiff bias on the part of the author. Rather, the quote should be
read broadly to imply that the attorney representing a lender must also act as "attorney
general" to ensure compliance in order to avoid potential problems.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

41

